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At approximately 12:30 PM on Saturday September 21, 2013, armed assailants attacked
the upscale Westgate shopping mall in the Westlands area of Nairobi, Kenya. Using the
seven key Major Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) principles,
command, safety, communication, assessment, triage, treatment, and transport, the Aga
Khan University Hospital, Nairobi (AKUH,N) emergency department (ED) successfully
coordinated the reception and care of all the casualties brought to the hospital.
This report describes the AKUH,N ED response to the ﬁrst civilian mass-casualty
shooting incident in Kenya, with the hope of informing the development and implementation
of mass-casualty emergency preparedness plans by other EDs and hospitals in Kenya,
appropriate for the local health care system.
Wachira BW, Abdalla RO, Wallis LA. Westgate shootings: an emergency department
approach to a mass-casualty incident. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2014;29(5):1-4.
Introduction
At approximately 12:30 PM on Saturday, September 21, 2013, armed assailants attacked
the upscale Westgate shopping mall in the Westlands area of Nairobi, Kenya.1 Overall,
more than 175 people were injured and 67 people died. Casualties were rushed to
the nearby hospitals by private ambulance services that had responded to the incident.
Using Major Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) principles,2
the Aga Khan University Hospital, Nairobi (AKUH,N) emergency department (ED)
successfully coordinated the reception and care of the 65 casualties brought to the
hospital.
The AKUH,N is a Joint Commission International-accredited private university
hospital located less than three kilometers away from the Westgate shopping mall.3 It is a
Level I trauma facility with over 300 beds. The ED has 24 beds and a resuscitation room
which is equipped with two monitored beds and a fully stocked resuscitation trolley. The
ED sees over 60,000 patients per year. Portable X-ray and ultrasound are immediately
available from the radiology department. The computed tomography scanner is located
next to the ED. There are ﬁve operating theatres, with specialized theatres for
neurosurgery, orthopedics, and cardiac surgery. In addition, the hospital has an 11-bed
high dependency unit (HDU) and a 20-bed intensive care unit (ICU). Bed occupancy in
the hospital is routinely over 80%.
Major Incident Medical Management and Support exists to teach the nature and
management of a major incident and how to deliver the medical support needed at
the scene of a major incident. At least nine major incidents have occurred in Kenya
each year in the last ﬁve years.4 Many injured victims from the scene arrive in hospital
untriaged and with barely any prehospital interventions. This essentially transfers
the scene of the major incident to the ED. This was the rationale for the adoption of
the MIMMS principles in the development of the AKUH,N ED mass-casualty manage-
ment plan.
This report describes the AKUH,N ED’s response to the ﬁrst civilian mass-casualty
shooting incident in Kenya. It identiﬁes system processes that optimized the use of
resources and reduced critical mortality in the face of maximum surge. The purpose of this
report is to inform the development and implementation of mass-casualty emergency
preparedness plans by other emergency departments and hospitals in Kenya, appropriate
for the local health care system.
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Emergency Department Response
The AKUH,N has a hospital-wide mass-casualty management
plan that was developed by the hospital’s emergency preparedness
committee based on the California Emergency Medical Services
Authority Hospital Incident Command System (HICS).5 The
HICS is an incident command system designed for hospitals of all
sizes with tools needed to advance their emergency preparedness
and response capability—both individually and as members of the
broader response community.
The speciﬁc ED mass-casualty management plan falls within
the operations section of the hospital’s plan as shown in Figure 1.
The emergency preparedness committee conducts training for
all new employees, refresher training and skills check for all
current employees, and holds annual hospital-wide drills. The
speciﬁc ED mass-casualty management plan is based on the
seven key MIMMS principles: command, safety, communica-
tion, assessment, triage, treatment, and transport.
Command
The ED nurse manager had overall responsibility for the
department. The manager facilitated all the services in the ED
and ensured close communication and cooperation between them.
Some of the services included triage and treatment, porter services,
cleaning services, and provision of medical supplies. The manager
also provided the link with the rest of the hospital administration
as per the HICS principles.
Safety
The 1-2-3 of safety is of self, scene (the ED), and survivors. Staff
safety in the ED was assured by immediate provision of personal
protective equipment (gowns, gloves, and masks).
Safety of ED was achieved by effective control of all the access
points into the ED at the onset of the major incident activation.
Armed security personnel were deployed to the hospital and a
security guard was placed at all entry points to the ED. Only
authorized hospital personnel were allowed into the ED. A
security guard was also placed at the entrance of the treatment
area designated for immediate priority casualties to limit access to
only authorized personnel. The security guards prevented those
arriving to assist, the media, and the general public who wanted
to observe from interfering with the response, or worse, becoming
part of the incident.
Safety for the casualties was also guaranteed by dedicated
treatment teams provided at all stages of their management as
described below.
Communication
The quality of the ﬁrst information that was passed from the
scene to the ED was inadequate due to the lack of a well-
coordinated and reliable national disaster alert and coordination
system. Information about the incident was obtained from media
reports and witness accounts initially before the exact nature of
the situation on scene was established. Due to the delay in
obtaining this information, the hospital staff activation plan was
only instituted as per the hospital’s mass-casualty management
plan when the exact nature of the incident was known. The
majority of the staff who reported to the hospital did so voluntarily
after hearing about the incident through media reports.
Assessment
The acronym METHANE (major incident, exact location, type
of incident, hazards, access, number of casualties, and emergency
services) is recommended in MIMMS as a reminder of the key
information to be passed from the scene. The same acronym was
used to assess the ED’s preparedness once the major incident was
declared by the hospital’s incident commander. The exact
location of the incident was known, along with its proximity to
the hospital. The incident was initially thought to be a robbery
from the initial reports, but the exact nature was realized as the
ﬁrst casualties arrived and more information was obtained from
the scene. A hazard identiﬁed was the risk of armed perpetrators
entering the premises. Additional security personnel were deployed
as detailed above. Access and egress routes for ambulances to the
ED were predesignated to prevent build-up of trafﬁc. Unfortu-
nately, due to the lack of a centralized ambulance dispatch system,
there was no means of knowing the number of casualties at the
scene or being transported to the ED. Due to the high numbers of
patients seen in the ED daily, the department is usually well-
staffed, and with the activation of the major incident, additional
staff members responded from the various departments.
Triage
Triage was established outside the door of the ED. A senior
emergency physician was the ED triaging ofﬁcer. Casualties were
separated into different treatment priorities based on the history
from the ambulance crew that brought in the casualty and a quick
assessment as the casualty was transferred from the ambulance to
the ED.
Casualties were prioritized into three categories: immediate
(red), urgent (yellow), and delayed priority (green). Casualties
with signiﬁcant injuries to the head, neck, or torso were triaged
‘‘immediate priority,’’ those with injuries to any other part of the
body were triaged ‘‘urgent priority,’’ and those with no obvious
injuries were triaged ‘‘delayed priority.’’
Once triaged, the casualties triaged ‘‘immediate’’ and ‘‘urgent
priority’’ were transferred to predesignated areas of the ED based
on their triage category. Casualties triaged ‘‘delayed priority’’ did
not access the ED, but were ushered through a separate entrance
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Figure 1. AKUH,N Incident Command Structure.
Abbreviation: AKUH,N, Aga Khan University Hospital, Nairobi.
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to the casualty clearing station that was located in a separate
section of the hospital, close to the ED.
Once in the ED, casualties were retriaged after the primary and
secondary surveys and resuscitation was done by the treatment
teams and more information was available. Patients whose triage
status changed were then moved to the appropriate predesignated
section of the ED based on their new triage status in consultation
with the triaging ofﬁcer.
The chief surgical resident, now based in the ED, was the
surgical triage ofﬁcer. After stabilization by the treatment teams
in the ED, casualties who needed surgical intervention were
triaged again by the surgical triage ofﬁcer into priorities for
transfer to the operating room (OR) for surgery. The ofﬁcer was
in constant communication with the OR teams and prioritized
the casualties for OR based on the severity of their injuries. This
was coordinated in conjunction with the ED triaging ofﬁcer and
the ED nurse manager.
Treatment
Overall, the AKUH,N ED received 65 casualties, mainly within
the ﬁrst six hours after the incident started. There were 58 (89%)
adult casualties ($13 years). Thirty-three (51%) casualties were
male. The age distribution of the casualties is shown in Figure 2.
Treatment teams consisting of a doctor and a nurse were
formed at the beginning of the response. Additional staff that
arrived were paired similarly. These teams were distributed out to
four designated areas across the hospital based on their expertise.
The ﬁrst group of treatment teams was based in the ED. After
triage, each casualty was assigned to a speciﬁc team who then did
the primary and secondary surveys as per the American College of
Surgeons Advance Trauma Life Support protocols6 and resusci-
tated the casualties appropriately. The second group was
designated to the radiology department where they re-evaluated
the casualties that were sent there from the ED and determined
and prioritized the required imaging. A third group comprised of
doctors mainly from the surgical department was designated to
the surgical holding area, located next to the ED. All casualties
coming back from radiology were reviewed in the surgical holding
area and either admitted or sent to the casualty clearing station
for the discharge processes. The ﬁnal group was based in the
casualty clearing station. Casualties who were triaged ‘‘delayed
priority’’ and casualties designated for discharge from either the
ED or the surgical holding area were reviewed here and all the
necessary documentation and discharge plans made.
Twenty-ﬁve casualties (38%) were treated in the ED for soft
tissue injuries and discharged on the same day. Forty casualties
(62%) were admitted into the hospital, three to the ICU, three to
HDU, and the rest to the surgical wards. The injuries sustained
by casualties admitted to the hospital from the Westgate incident
is shown in Table 1.
Of the admitted casualties, 30 (75%) needed surgery, more
than half of them (53%, n5 16) required multiple surgeries.
Nineteen casualties (63%) were operated on within 24 hours of
the incident.
The median duration of stay of all admitted casualties was ﬁve
days (range, 4-14). One casualty who was six months pregnant
was brought in deceased and another casualty succumbed to
injuries the following day post surgery in the ICU.
Transport
Flow of casualties from the ED and through the hospital was
maintained by the porters who were made readily available on
activation of the major incident. This avoided crowding in the
ED and other sections of the hospital (eg, radiology). On arrival
to the ED, casualties were assessed quickly, stabilized, and
transferred from the ED either to radiology, OR, or the casualty
clearing station. Casualties coming back from radiology went
to the surgical holding area from where they were managed
appropriately. By creating a one-directional ﬂow of casualties
through the ED, the department was always prepared to receive
more casualties who may have still been coming from the scene.
Discussion
This is the ﬁrst description of the emergency management of a mass-
casualty incident in a Kenyan hospital. The purpose of this report is
to inform the development and implementation of mass-casualty
emergency preparedness plans for EDs and hospitals in Kenya.
At least nine major incidents have occurred in Kenya each year
in the last ﬁve years.4 The repetitive nature of these incidents
recently, with a high number of deaths and injuries, suggests
that all EDs in Kenya need to be adequately prepared to handle
mass-casualty incidents.
Preparedness to take action is the prime instrument for reducing
morbidity and mortality from mass-casualty incidents. Development
of an integrated mass-casualty emergency preparedness plan should
be a multi-departmental process, involving different departments in
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Figure 2. Age Distribution of Casualties







Soft Tissue Wounds 12
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Table 1. Injuries Sustained by Casualties Admitted from the
Westgate Incident
aSome casualties had more than one injury.
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the hospital. With management of everyone’s roles, and agreement
on the command and control structures, preparedness capacity can
be built and streamlined, improving coordination during major
incidents.
Evidence from recurrent major incidents in the country should
inform the training of all ED staff in major incident medical
management and support and the development of integrated
hospital and ED mass-casualty emergency preparedness plans.
Key coordination hubs and standard operating procedures should
also be established and tested with comprehensive drills, so that
the ED and the institution can be more prepared to act in major
incidents.
The major limitation faced was the identiﬁcation of casualties
from the onset and tracking their ﬂow through the hospital in
the initial phase of the response. Though most casualties were
able to provide a name or were identiﬁed by relatives when they
arrived, there was no standard identiﬁcation and tracking system
speciﬁc to the casualties of the major incident. Though this did
not interfere with their care as treatment teams managed the
casualties at all times, there was a delay in providing timely
information on the actual number and location of the casualties at
any given moment as they moved through the different sections
of the hospital. A system is currently being worked out to ﬁnd the
best way to improve on this in the future.
Conclusion
This report describes the AKUH,N ED response during the
Westgate mass-casualty shooting incident. Using the MIMMS
principles of command, safety, communication, assessment, triage,
treatment, and transport, the ED was able to successfully coordi-
nate the reception and care of all casualties brought to the hospital
after the shootings. Development and implementation of mass-
casualty emergency preparedness plans for EDs and hospitals in the
country, based on recent major incidents, will greatly enhance the
country’s preparedness and response to major incidents.
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